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Policy Points:
 Regulatory agencies may have limited evidence on the clinical benefits
and harms of new drugs when deciding whether new therapeutic agents
are allowed to enter the market and under which conditions, includ-
ing whether approval is granted under special regulatory pathways and
obligations to address knowledge gaps through postmarketing studies
are imposed.
 In a matched comparison of marketing applications for cancer drugs of
uncertain therapeutic value reviewed by both the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), we
found frequent discordance between the two agencies on regulatory out-
comes and the use of special regulatory pathways. Both agencies often
granted regular approval, even when the other agency judged there to
be substantial uncertainty about drug benefits and risks that needed to
be resolved through additional studies in the postmarketing period.
 Postmarketing studies imposed by regulators under special approval
pathways to address remaining questions of efficacy and safety may not
be suited to deliver timely, confirmatory evidence due to shortcomings
in study design and delays, raising questions over the suitability of the
FDA’s Accelerated Approval and the EMA’s Conditional Marketing Au-
thorization as tools for allowing early market access for cancer drugs
while maintaining rigorous regulatory standards.
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Context: Regulatory agencies are increasingly required to make market ap-
proval decisions for new drugs on the basis of limited clinical evidence, a
situation commonly encountered in cancer. We aimed to investigate how reg-
ulators manage uncertainty in the benefit-risk profiles of new cancer drugs by
comparing decisions for the world’s two largest regulatory bodies—the US Food
andDrug Administration (FDA) and the EuropeanMedicines Agency (EMA)—
over a 5-year period.
Methods:We systematically identified a set of cancer drug-indication pairs for
which data on efficacy and safety was less complete than that required for reg-
ular approval at time of market entry from 2009 to 2013, as determined by
the FDA’s use of Accelerated Approval (AA) or the EMA’s use of Conditional
Marketing Authorization (CMA) pathways, and matched these across the two
agencies. Using publicly available information, we compared regulatory path-
ways and outcomes, final approved indications, and postmarketing obligations
imposed by the agencies.
Findings: We identified 21 cancer drug-indication pairs that received FDA
AA, EMACMA, or both. Althoughmost applications relied on identical pivotal
trials across the FDA and the EMA, regulatory pathways often differed; 57% of
indications received either FDA AA or EMA CMA, and regular approval by the
other agency. After approval, the EMA more often accepted single-arm studies
to confirm clinical benefit compared to the FDA (75% vs. 29% of indications),
and the FDA more commonly requested randomized controlled trials (85% vs.
50%). Forty-one percent of confirmatory trials after FDA AA were conducted
in different populations than the approved indication, compared to 13% after
EMA CMA. Both agencies relied primarily on surrogate measures of patient
benefit for postmarketing obligations. After a median follow-up of 7.25 years,
40% of FDA and 61% of EMA postmarketing obligations after AA and CMA,
respectively, were delayed.
Conclusions: US and European regulators often deemed early and less com-
plete evidence on benefit-risk profiles of cancer drugs sufficient to grant reg-
ular approval, raising questions over regulatory standards for the approval of
new medicines. Even when imposing confirmatory studies in the postmarket-
ing period through special approval pathways, meaningful evidence may not
materialize due to shortcomings in study design and delays in conducting re-
quired studies with due diligence.
Keywords: pharmaceutical regulation, US Food and Drug Administration,
European Medicines Agency, cancer.
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IntheUnited States (US) and the EuropeanUnion (EU), reg-ulatory agencies—the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), respectively—are
responsible for assessing the benefit-risk profile of new drugs before
they enter the market. The mandate of these regulators to protect public
health by ensuring that patients have access to safe and efficacious drugs
requires them to carefully balance the need for robust and comprehen-
sive evidence on efficacy and safety at the time of market approval while
making promising new drugs available to patients in a timely manner.
This “evidence vs. access conundrum”1 can also be framed in terms of the
amount of uncertainty regulators are willing to accept. Placing a greater
weight on the availability of complete evidence for regulatory decision
making, typically obtained from randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
that measure patient-relevant endpoints such as survival, means more
certainty that drugs available on the market have a positive benefit-risk
profile. Conversely, granting approval on the basis of incomplete evi-
dence shows greater willingness to accept uncertainty about a new drug’s
therapeutic value.
Beginning in the 1980s—in response to pressure from the pharma-
ceutical industry and some patient advocates, and as instructed by the
US Congress—the FDA introduced special regulatory provisions that
aimed to shorten the time to market approval for products intended to
treat patients with serious illnesses.2 These provisions either expedite the
regulatory review process by reducing the time available for regulators to
review new applications (Priority Review, introduced in 1992), or they
expedite the premarket drug development process by allowing pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers to submit preliminary (or immature) evidence on
efficacy and safety (Accelerated Approval, or AA, introduced in 1992).3
The EMA, following the example of the FDA, introduced similar
provisions that either shortened regulatory review times (Accelerated
Assessment, introduced in 2004; PRIME, 2016) or changed evidentiary
standards compared to regular approval (Approval Under Exceptional
Circumstances, 1995; Conditional Marketing Authorization, or CMA,
2006).4 In both the United States and the EU, these special regulatory
programs most commonly benefit cancer drugs.5-7 While they appear
to have succeeded in reducing the time until marketing authorization
in the United States8—although not in Europe9—a body of literature
is emerging that questions their benefits to patients. Research on
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special approval pathways has pointed toward questionable novelty
of drugs that benefited from these programs,6,10 a higher number of
safety events in the United States (although not in Europe),11,12 and an
erosion of the evidence landscape, with robust evidence on the efficacy
and safety of new medicines often unavailable at the time of marketing
authorization and unlikely to become available in a timely manner in
the postapproval phase.13-16
Whilst the programs discussed here all aim to reduce the amount of
time it takes for drugs to be approved onto the market, AA in the United
States and CMA in the EU are particularly illustrative from a regulatory
perspective because they shift part of the evidence generation for regula-
tory decision making from the preapproval to the postapproval period.
This allows drugs to enter the market based on evidence that regulators
consider to be preliminary and in need of further substantiation. First
introduced in the United States in 1992, AA allows early approval of
drugs that address an unmet medical need in the treatment of a serious
condition and provide a meaningful advantage over available therapeutic
options. AA is granted on the basis of a surrogate measure that is consid-
ered to be “reasonably likely” to predict clinical benefit but has not been
validated, and includes an obligation to generate confirmatory evidence
of this benefit through postmarketing studies.17 Although the prelimi-
nary and limited nature of the evidence submitted at the time of initial
approval introduces uncertainty, this is, in theory, addressed through
mandatory postmarketing studies. In practice, research has shown that
uncertainty may persist for years after initial approval due to design lim-
itations of postmarketing studies (including continuing reliance on sur-
rogate measures18) and/or their untimely completion.14
In the EU, the CMA pathway largely follows the same principle as
AA, as it allows the EMA to grant approval conditional on complying
with obligations to generate additional evidence in the postmarketing
phase.19 In both markets, decisions to pursue approval via the AA or
CMA pathway are often made late in the process of bringing a drug to
market,9,20 and, in the case of the EMA, are seen by the regulator as
a “rescue option” to grant approval when available evidence is insuffi-
cient for regular approval. Important differences between EMA’s CMA
and FDA’s AA include that only first marketing authorizations of new
products are eligible for CMA, whereas the AA pathway is also available
for additional indications of approved medicines, and that CMA is re-
viewed annually until all obligations are fulfilled. The vast majority of
drugs approved through CMA and AA pathways are cancer drugs.7,14
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Although formal criteria for drug approval are specified in law and
regulation (see Box for an overview of AA and CMA provisions), in
practice regulators, in negotiation with companies, are afforded some
flexibility when determining what constitutes an acceptable level of
uncertainty21 and may use a range of regulatory tools to manage sit-
uations where evidence on efficacy and safety is limited. If regulators
judge the magnitude of uncertainty to be such that it precludes regu-
lar approval, they may grant approval under a special pathway (AA in
the United States or CMA in the EU) but impose postmarketing study
obligations to address critical knowledge gaps as described earlier. Reg-
ulators may also restrict the approved indication to a specific subset of
the studied population for which more robust evidence exists. Alterna-
tively, regulators may decide there is insufficient evidence to support
either regular, special, or some form of restricted approval, and refuse
marketing authorization.
Box. Comparison of Special Approval Pathways in Europe (Condi-
tional Marketing Authorization, CMA) and the United States (Acceler-
ated Approval, AA)
EMA Conditional Marketing
Authorization19 FDA Accelerated Approval17
Key features  Requires four criteria to be
fulfilled, including a positive
benefit-risk profile and the
ability to provide
comprehensive data through
postmarketing studies
 Marketing authorization is
reviewed every year until
conditions of initial
authorization are fulfilled
 Can only be granted for first
marketing authorizations
 Allows market entry of drugs on the
basis of a surrogate endpoint that is
“reasonably likely” to predict
clinical benefit (as opposed to a
validated surrogate endpoint)
 Clinical benefit is to be confirmed
through postmarketing trials
 Can be granted for first marketing
authorizations as well as further
indications for approved medicines
Eligibility
criteria
Medicinal products that fulfill one
of the following:
 Treat, prevent, or diagnose
seriously debilitating or
life-threatening diseases
 Are used in response to public
health emergency situations
 Are designated as orphan
medicinal products
Drugs and biologics that fulfill all of the
following:
 Address an unmet medical need in
the treatment of a serious condition
 Provide a meaningful advantage
over available therapies (where a
therapy exists)
 Have been shown to be effective on
the basis of an endpoint “reasonably
likely” to predict clinical benefit
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EMA Conditional Marketing
Authorization19 FDA Accelerated Approval17
Evidence
assessment
Requires that four criteria are
fulfilled:
 Positive benefit-risk ratio is
established
 The manufacturer is likely to be
able to provide additional data
 The product fulfills an unmet
medical need
 Benefits to public health of
immediate availability of the
product outweigh the risks of
incomplete evidence
The same statutory requirements as for
regular approval must be met:
 Substantial evidence on efficacy
based on adequate and
well-controlled trials
 Sufficient information to determine
the drug is safe
However, the evidence standard is
different:
 Efficacy can be demonstrated on the
basis of a surrogate endpoint that
was determined to be “reasonably
likely” to predict clinical benefit
 FDA accepts that evidence will
generally come from fewer, smaller,
and shorter trials
Theoretical
consequences
for failure to
comply with
conditions
Failure to comply with
postmarketing obligations will lead
to an assessment report by the
EMA, which can result in one of
the following:22
 Letter to the marketing
authorization holder (i.e., the
pharmaceutical company)
 Oral explanation by the
marketing authorization holder
 Initiation of procedure to vary,
suspend, or revoke approval
 Inspection
 Failure to conduct postmarketing
studies “with due diligence” may
result in withdrawal of approval
 Violation of postmarketing
obligations may also result in civil
monetary penalties of up to US
$250,00023
How these different regulatory tools are used by the FDA and the
EMA to manage situations with substantial uncertainty about the bene-
fits and harms of a new drug is not adequately researched. The majority
of previous studies of cancer drug approvals had a primary focus on
one of the two agencies.18,20,24-26 Although some studies documented
regulatory decision making under uncertainty, they were limited to the
perspective of a single regulatory agency.9,21 Comparative studies of
the FDA and the EMA mainly examined differences in time to market
approval9,27–30 or focused on the use of individual regulatory tools such
as approval decisions or wording of approved indications.29,31,32 Previous
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studies have not systematically compared the use of a comprehensive set
of regulatory tools by the FDA and the EMA in situations with limited
clinical evidence about the benefit-risk profile of new drugs. Therefore,
important gaps remain to characterize the decisions made by regulators
under such circumstances, including whether approval is granted, which
approval pathway is used, whether wording of final approved indications
have restrictions, and which additional evidence regulators require to be
generated.
We aimed to analyze how the FDA and the EMA deal with uncer-
tainty by comparing regulatory outcomes (approval vs. no approval de-
cision), pathways (regular approval vs. approval through a special path-
way), final approved indications, and regulator-imposed obligations to
generate additional evidence in the postmarketing phase, for a matched
set of cancer drug-indication pairs with less complete data at time of
market entry than usually required for regulatory approval. We focus on
cancer drugs, since this is the therapeutic area with the largest propor-
tion of drug approvals benefiting from special regulatory pathways and
with the highest discrepancy in regulatory approval decisions between
these two regulatory bodies.31
Methods
We compared the EMA’s and the FDA’s handling of uncertainty in
four steps. First, we systematically identified a set of cancer drug-
indication pairs that were judged by regulators to have limited evi-
dence on efficacy and safety at the time of approval and still required
confirmation. We used approval through either the EMA’s CMA or
the FDA’s AA pathway to indicate drugs for which at least one of the
two regulators considered the uncertainty about efficacy and safety at
the time of market entry to be substantial enough to preclude regular
approval. Second, we matched this set of drug-indication pairs across
the EMA and the FDA. Third, we reviewed publicly available regula-
tory documents to compile information from the EMA and the FDA
on regulatory pathways and outcomes, final approved indications, piv-
otal trial characteristics, and postmarketing obligations for each drug-
indication pair. Fourth, we compared the compiled information between
the EMA and the FDA. We describe each step in more detail in this
section.
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From all cancer drug indications approved by the EMA (from incep-
tion of the CMA pathway in 2006 until 2016) or the FDA (from incep-
tion of the AA pathway in 1992 until 2017), we identified those that
were approved through either the EMA CMA or the FDA AA path-
way from published reports.7,18 This list included all cancer drugs for
which at least one of the two agencies considered the evidence at the
time of approval less complete than required for regular approval. For
each of the drug-indication pairs on this list, we then conducted tar-
geted database searches on the EMA and FDA websites to identify the
closest matching drug-indication pairs with a regulatory outcome by
the other agency. At a minimum, indications had to match on cancer
type (e.g., lung cancer, breast cancer, haematologic malignancies), fol-
lowed by line of treatment, single agent and combination therapy, and
population (e.g., type of tumor, biomarkers, histology), if possible. For
example, if a drug-indication pair was included in the list because it
received EMA CMA, we searched all FDA regulatory outcomes for the
name of the drug and then compared whether EMA and FDA indica-
tions matched on cancer type, followed by other characteristics. If no
better match based on the parameters could be identified, we consid-
ered EMA-FDA drug-indication pairs as matches as long as the cancer
type was the same. Thus, a match could be considered for the same drug
indicated for first-line treatment by one agency and second-line treat-
ment by the other agency, as long as no regulatory decision about the
same-line treatment was available from both agencies. Differences in fi-
nal approved indications between matched drug-indication pairs were
documented.29
For the EMA, database searches allowed us to identify drugs that
were approved, drugs that were denied approval, and drug marketing
authorization applications withdrawn by the manufacturer in anticipa-
tion of a negative outcome before a final recommendation was formed.
For the FDA, database searches allowed us to systematically identify only
those drugs that were approved. When a drug was not found in the FDA
database, we conducted additional web searches andmade use of publicly
available documents (such as committee meeting minutes) for informa-
tion about whether an application had been submitted.
We restricted this set of drug-indication pairs to those with an EMA
regulatory outcome (approval, no approval, or application withdrawn
by the manufacturer) between 2009 and 2013. The time period was
chosen to allow for sufficient time for postmarketing obligations to be
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completed (minimum of 5 years postapproval until we conducted data
collection in December 2018). We excluded regulatory outcomes for
generics, treatments of benign tumors, supportive treatments, and ad-
vanced medicine therapy products such as gene or cell therapies.
For each matched drug-indication pair, we compiled information on
the regulatory outcome and pathway, current status, final approved indi-
cation, pivotal trial(s) at the time of initial approval, and postmarketing
obligations and their current status from various sources. Information
relating to the regulatory assessment procedure was extracted from pub-
licly available documents at the EMA (European Assessment Reports, or
EPARs, accessed through the EMA website) and the FDA (review doc-
uments, label, approval letter, and administrative and correspondence
documents, accessed through the Drugs@FDA database) and included
information on regulatory outcome and pathway, submission and de-
cision dates, orphan drug designation status, and whether the applica-
tion was for a first marketing authorization or a supplemental approval
(variation) of a previously approved drug. Pivotal trial characteristics for
most drug-indication pairs were available from two previous studies of
all FDA and EMA accelerated approvals.14,24 For drug-indication pairs
not included in these studies, we extracted relevant information on EMA
and FDA pivotal trials from EPARs and review documents and labels,
respectively.Where an application for marketing authorization included
more than one indication for the same drug, we treated these as separate
drug-indication pairs in order to assess the evidence submitted and col-
lected in the postmarketing setting for each indication.
We extracted information on postmarketing studies that were re-
quired by the regulator to confirm the product’s efficacy and safety,
which we collectively refer to as postmarketing obligations. These in-
cluded specific obligations under CMA as well as Annex II conditions
for EMA approvals; and AA Subparts E and H, as well as section 505(o)
requirements, for FDA approvals. We did not extract information on
studies that formed part of routine pharmacovigilance activities, that
were conducted voluntarily by the manufacturer, or that were conducted
in animals or cells. Further, we categorized studies as either focusing on
confirmation of clinical efficacy and safety or investigating other issues
(e.g., pharmacokinetics and dosing studies), and we report results only
for the former. We further assessed whether clinical efficacy and safety
studies were conducted in a patient population similar to the approved
indication. We categorized postmarketing study populations as similar
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to the approved indication when the study was conducted in patients
who could receive the drug according to its approved label or when the
study was a follow-up of the pivotal trial. Postmarketing study popu-
lations were categorized as dissimilar to the approved indication when
there were obvious differences, such as a different cancer type, and when
the line of treatment was different (e.g., postmarketing study is con-
ducted in previously untreated patients when the approved indication is
for second-line treatment). A postmarketing obligation was considered
fulfilled when the regulator removed it from the list of required studies,
including cases in which the manufacturer was released from the obliga-
tion without submitting the results from a completed study. Additional
information on the compilation of information on postmarketing obli-
gations and their status is provided in the Online Appendix.
In the next section, we present key features of the regulatory
decisions—including regulatory outcome, pathway, pivotal trial evi-
dence, final approved indication, and postmarketing obligations—for
each matched drug-indication pair and describe differences and similar-
ities between the EMA and the FDA.
Results
We identified a total of 116 cancer drug-indication pairs with limited
clinical data on efficacy and safety, as indicated by approval granted
through either EMA CMA (n = 19; 11% of all approved EMA cancer
drug indications from 2006 to 2016) or FDA AA (n = 97; 36% of all
approved FDA cancer drug indications from 1992 to 2017) pathways.
After matching these with all other available EMA and FDA decisions
and excluding matched pairs without an EMA regulatory outcome be-
tween 2009 and 2013, we arrived at a sample of 21 unique matched
drug-indication pairs of cancer products that received approval through
the EMA’s CMA or the FDA’s AA pathway (Figure 1).
Table 1 provides an overview of regulatory pathways and outcomes
of the 21 matched drug-indication pairs. Compared to the FDA, the
EMA more often granted regular approval (seven [33%] vs. five [24%]
of matched drug-indication pairs, respectively) or did not grant approval
(four [19%] vs. one [5%]), whereas the FDAmore often utilized AA (15
[71%]) compared to the EMA using CMA (10 [48%]). Overall, there
was little overlap in the use of special regulatory pathways at the EMA
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Figure 1. Flow Chart of Selection Process for Matched Drug-Indication
Pairs
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Table 1. Combinations of Regulatory Pathways and Outcomes in 21
Matched Cancer Drug-Indication Pairs (Number of Drug-Indication
Pairs, Percent of Total Sample)
FDA
Regular
Approval
FDA
AA
No FDA
Approval Total
EMA Regular
Approval
— 7 (33%) — 7 (33%)
EMA CMA 5 (24%) 4 (19%) 1 (5%) 10 (48%)
No EMA Approval — 4 (19%) — 4 (19%)
Total 5 (24%) 15 (71%) 1 (5%) 21 (100%)
Abbreviations: AA, Accelerated Approval; CMA, Conditional Marketing Authorization;
EMA, European Medicines Agency; FDA, US Food and Drug Administration.
and the FDA. Only four (19%) matched drug-indication pairs received
approval through both the EMA CMA and the FDA AA pathways. The
most common combination of regulatory pathways was regular EMA
approval and FDA AA (seven indications [33%]), followed by the re-
verse, EMA CMA and regular FDA approval (five indications [24%]).
A further four (19%) indications were not approved by the EMA but
benefited from FDA AA, and one indication with EMA CMA approval
was not approved by the FDA.
Sixteen of 21 matched drug-indication pairs were first marketing au-
thorizations (Table 2). The remaining five indications were variations of
prior approvals and therefore not eligible for EMACMA. Four of the five
variations were approved under the regular EMA and FDA AA path-
ways. As of December 2018, half of the indications with EMA CMA
had been converted to full (regular) approvals. The other half (n= 5) re-
mained under CMA provisions. Conversely, for 13 of 15 indications with
FDA AA, all postmarketing obligations had been fulfilled by December
2018.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Matched Drug-Indication Pairs
EMA FDA
Number of indications (%)
Matched Drug-Indication Pairs,
Total
21 21
Orphan designation 14 (67%) 15 (71%)
First marketing authorization 16 (76%) 16 (76%)
Current status (December 2018)
Fully approved 12 (57%) 18 (86%)
Remains under special approval
(CMA/AA)
5 (24%) 2 (10%)
Not approved 4 (19%) 1 (5%)
Abbreviations: AA, Accelerated Approval; CMA, Conditional Marketing Authorization;
EMA, European Medicines Agency; FDA, US Food and Drug Administration.
Comparison of Regulatory Pathways and
Outcomes with Pivotal Trial Evidence
To further investigate the discrepancies in the use of regulatory pathways
between the two agencies and explore possible explanatory factors, such
as availability of more robust efficacy and safety data, as well as statutory
restrictions on the use of EMA CMA, we compared the approval path-
ways, pivotal trial evidence, and final approved indications for each of
the 21 matched drug-indication pairs (Table 3).
Overall, regulatory decisions for 17 of the 21 (81%) matched drug-
indication pairs were based on the same pivotal trials. For the remaining
four drug-indication pairs, differences in pivotal trials were due to the
EMA considering a trial included in the evidence package as “support-
ive” that was labeled “pivotal” by the FDA in two cases, and due to
different trials being submitted to the EMA and the FDA in the other
two cases.
Regular EMA approvals with matching FDA AA were more often
based on RCTs (five of six pivotal trials [83%]) compared to regular
FDA approvals with matching EMA CMA (two of four pivotal trials
[50%]).
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Table 3. Comparison of Approval, Regulatory Pathway, Pivotal Trial De-
sign, and Approved Indication for Matched Drug-Indication Pairs
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None of the pivotal trials submitted for 21 marketing authorization
applications at the two agencies used overall survival as a primary end-
point. Indications approved through the EMA’s CMA and the FDA’s AA
pathways were predominantly based on trials with response rate end-
points, although EMA CMAs also relied on progression-free survival
(PFS) or recurrence-free survival in three of 10 trials (30%) compared
to two of 17 trials (12%) in FDA approvals with AA. Both the EMA
(in four cases) and the FDA (in two cases) granted regular approval on
the basis of trials with response endpoints for matched drug-indication
pairs that were approved through special pathways (CMA or AA) by the
other agency.
Among indications approved through both the EMA CMA and FDA
AA pathways (n = 4), there were no meaningful differences in the final
approved indications in two cases, and the EMA used a more restrictive
final approved indication for the remaining two.
Among indications with regular EMA approval and FDA AA (n =
7), the EMA used more restrictive wording in three cases that were
based on the same pivotal trial evidence. For pomalidomide, the EMA’s
regular approval was restricted to combination therapy with dexam-
ethasone, mirroring how the drug was studied in the pivotal trial ac-
cepted by the EMA. Four of the seven drug-indication pairs with regular
EMA approval and FDA AA were variations of existing approvals (dasa-
tinib, imatinib, laptinib, nilotinib), therefore excluding the possibility
of EMA CMA, and three (pomalidomide and two ponatinib indications)
were initial marketing authorization applications, without statutory re-
strictions regarding the regulatory pathway. The EMA used more re-
strictive wording for the three initial marketing authorizations, but for
only one of the four variations.
Comparison of Postmarketing Obligations
There was overall considerable heterogeneity between the EMA and the
FDA with respect to the number of postmarketing studies required,
their objectives, and design characteristics. Key characteristics of clin-
ical postmarketing obligations at the aggregate level are presented in
Table 4 (see the Appendix for additional details on postmarketing obli-
gations). A comparison of postmarketing obligations at the level of drug-
indication pair is shown in Figures 2–4.
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Table 4. Key Characteristics of Clinical Postmarketing Obligations
(PMOs) Imposed by the EMA and the FDA
EMA FDA
Criteria CMA
Regular
Approval Overall AA
Regular
Approval Overall
Number of Indications With
Clinical PMOs
10 2 12 15 2 17
Postmarketing obligation study
design
Included at least one RCT 5 1 6 (50%) 13 1 14 (82%)
Included at least one
single-arm trial
4 1 5 (42%) 3 0 3 (17%)
Included at least one
observational phase IV
5 1 6 (50%) 1 1 2 (12%)
Postmarketing obligation study
endpoint
Included at least one study
with overall survival as
primary endpoint
2 1 3 (25%) 3 1 4 (24%)
Included at least one RCT
with overall survival as
primary endpoint
0 1 1 (8%) 2 1 3 (18%)
Postmarketing obligation status
(December 2018)
All obligations fulfilled on
time
1 0 1 (8%) 5 0 5 (29%)
All obligations fulfilled,
with delays
4 1 5 (42%) 7 1 8 (47%)
Has open obligations,
running on time
0 0 0 (0%) 1 1 2 (12%)
Has open obligations,
running with delays
5 1 6 (50%) 2 0 2 (12%)
Abbreviations: AA, Accelerated Approval; CMA, Conditional Marketing Authorization;
EMA, European Medicines Agency; FDA, US Food and Drug Administration; RCT, ran-
domized controlled trial.
Overall, the EMA imposed clinical postmarketing obligations (i.e.,
obligations for confirmatory studies of clinical efficacy and/or safety in
patients) for 12 of 17 approved indications (71%; 10 of these were CMA)
and the FDA for 17 of 20 approved indications (85%; 15 of these were
AA). The mean number of clinical postmarketing obligations for EMA
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CMAs was 2.3 (range, 1 to 4) and 0.6 (range, 0 to 3) for EMA regular
approvals. It was 1.8 (range, 1 to 4) for indications approved through
the FDA AA pathway and 0.4 (range, 0 to 1) for FDA regular approvals.
There was only small overlap between the EMA and the FDA in indi-
vidual studies used to address postmarketing obligations. Postmarket-
ing obligations were addressed by 43 unique clinical studies, but only
two of these were used for both EMA and FDA obligations.
Key characteristics of clinical postmarketing obligations are shown in
Table 4. Postmarketing obligations included at least one RCT in six of
the 12 EMA approvals with obligations (50%), compared to 14 of the 17
FDA approvals with obligations (82%). EMA approvals included single-
arm or observational studies for nine of 12 approvals (75%), whereas only
five of 17 (29%) approved FDA indications with clinical confirmatory
studies included these noncomparative study designs. Overall survival
was a primary endpoint in postmarketing studies for only three of 12
approved EMA indications (25%) and four of 17 (24%) FDA indications.
These studies were RCTs in one EMA and three FDA approvals.
Eighty-seven percent of EMA postmarketing obligations after CMA
were conducted in populations similar to the approved indication—that
is, patients falling under the approved label or follow-up studies of the
pivotal trial. This was the case for only 59% of FDA obligations attached
to AA, with the remaining 41% conducted in different populations,
such as previously untreated patients or patients with different cancer
types (data shown in the Appendix).
Status of Postmarketing Obligations
We assessed the status of postmarketing obligations as of December
2018, resulting in a median follow-up time of 7.25 years overall (me-
dian 6.6 years for EMA and 7.5 years for FDA approvals). After this time,
half of EMA approvals with clinical postmarketing obligations had all
requirements fulfilled. However, there were delays for five of these, and
all obligations had been fulfilled on time for only one approved indica-
tion. The remaining 50% of approved EMA indications had open obliga-
tions, which were all running behind schedule. Of the 17 approved FDA
indications with clinical postmarketing obligations, five (29%) had ful-
filled all obligations on time, and obligations had been fulfilled with a
delay for eight indications (47%). Two approved FDA indications had
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open obligations running on time, and two with delays. EMA obliga-
tions had a median delay of 10 months (range, no delay to five years),
and FDA obligations had a median delay of zero months (range, no delay
to three years), although this included five cases in which the manufac-
turer was released from an obligation and it was therefore considered
fulfilled on time by the FDA. There were shorter delays for obligations
for indications approved under EMA CMA or FDA AA (EMA: median
six months; FDA: median zero months) compared to regular approvals
(EMA: median 29 months; FDA: median 17.5 months).
Postmarketing Evidence Generation
Among drug-indication pairs that received approvals through both
EMA CMA and FDA AA pathways (n = 4), EMA obligations included
a total of nine nonrandomized studies (comprising follow-up of pivotal
single-arm trials, new single-arm trials, and observational safety studies)
and a total of three RCTs, with no RCT imposed for two of the indica-
tions (Figure 2). In contrast, FDA obligations included one or two RCTs
for each indication. The FDA considered the evidence generation obli-
gations under AA for brentuximab vedotin fulfilled on the basis of the
results from one of the required RCTs, while the drug remained under
CMA provisions in Europe, with confirmatory studies ongoing and de-
layed by two to five years. For crizotinib, the same RCT was used in both
Europe and the United States to confirm clinical benefit. Ofatumumab
was also converted to regular approval by both agencies, although on the
basis of different studies: the confirmatory study requested by the EMA
was a new RCT conducted in patients with refractory disease (approved
indication),33 whereas the confirmatory FDA RCT was conducted in the
first-line setting.34
Among drug-indication pairs approved through regular EMA and
FDA AA pathways (n = 7), postmarketing studies were imposed by the
EMA for only two indications (lapatinib and pomalidomide), while the
FDA imposed obligations for all indications (Figure 3). FDA obligations
included a minimum of one RCT per indication, with the exception of
ponatinib for acute lymphoblastic leukemia. By December 2018, the
FDA considered postmarketing obligations fulfilled for all except one
drug (lapatinib), with confirmatory evidence submitted to the FDA on
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Figure 2. Premarketing and Postmarketing Evidence Requirements
and Status of Clinical Postmarketing Obligations (PMOs) for Matched
Drug-Indication Pairs With EMA CMA and FDA AA
Abbreviations: N/A, sample size not available because study is ongo-
ing; Obs, observational phase IV study; PMO, postmarketing obligation;
RCT, randomized controlled trial; SAT, single-arm trial.
a Sample size is for one RCT only, as the obligation for the other RCT
was considered fulfilled through a related obligation in the Hodgkin
lymphoma indication.
b Two obligations relating to the same RCT.
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Figure 3. Premarketing and Postmarketing Evidence Requirements
and Status of Clinical Postmarketing Obligations (PMOs) for Matched
Drug-Indication Pairs With Regular EMA Approval and FDA AA
Abbreviations: AA, FDA Accelerated Approval; N/A, sample size not
available because study is ongoing; Obs, observational phase IV study;
PMO, postmarketing obligation; RCT, randomized controlled trial;
SAT, single-arm trial.
a Three obligations relating to the same RCT.
b Sample size relates to one RCT only. Obligation for the other RCT was
considered fulfilled through another study.
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time in two cases (dasatinib and nilotinib) and with delays ranging be-
tween 11 and 20 months for the remaining indications.
Among indications with EMA CMA and regular FDA approval
(n = 5), the EMA imposed postmarketing studies for all conditionally
approved indications, while the FDA imposed obligations for only two
of them (vandetanib and vismodegib) (Figure 4). EMA obligations in-
cluded an RCT for only two of five conditionally approved indications.
Confirmatory studies for the remaining conditionally approved indica-
tions included observational phase IV studies, a follow-up of the piv-
otal single-arm trial, and a new single-arm trial. Two of the drugs were
converted to regular approval after delayed submission of confirmatory
study reports (pazopanib and vismodegib), while two others remained
under CMA after slow recruitment for confirmatory studies (bosutinib
and vandetanib).7,35
Discussion
We reviewed regulatory outcomes, pathways, pivotal trial evidence, fi-
nal approved indications, and postmarketing obligations of 21 matched
cancer drug-indication pairs for which early evidence is less complete
than normally required at the time of approval, to assess differences in
regulatory decisions under uncertainty between the EMA and the FDA.
We found that both agencies showed an overall high acceptance of un-
certainty, with the vast majority of applications in our sample of drugs
with limited evidence at the time of market entry being approved by
both regulators. Although both agencies overwhelmingly relied on the
same evidence base, there were frequent discrepancies in the use of spe-
cial (EMA CMA and FDA AA) vs. regular approval pathways across the
two settings. Finally, we found marked differences in the design and
objectives of postmarketing obligations imposed by the EMA and the
FDA.
Discrepancies in the Use of Special Regulatory
Pathways
While both the EMA and the FDA were more likely to grant, rather
than withhold, marketing approval for the cancer drug applications in
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Figure 4. Premarketing and Postmarketing Evidence Requirements
and Status of Clinical Postmarketing Obligations (PMOs) for Matched
Drug-Indication Pairs With Regular FDA Approval and EMA CMA
Abbreviations: CMA, European Medicines Agency Conditional Market-
ing Authorization; N/A, sample size not available because study is ongo-
ing; Obs, observational phase IV study; PMO, postmarketing obligation;
RCT, randomized controlled trial; SAT, single-arm trial.
a Two obligations relating to the same RCT.
b Four obligations (including 1 pooled analysis) relating to two SATs.
our cohort of matched drug-indication pairs, there was little concordance
in the use of regulatory pathways. There were only four of 21 cases in
which both the EMA and the FDA granted approval through CMA and
AA pathways, respectively, for the same drug-indication pair, while in
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12 cases one agency granted approval through one of these special regu-
latory pathways, but the other granted regular approval.
The distinction between regular approval and approval through EMA
CMA or FDA AA pathways is not trivial. For most of the 12 drug-
indication pairs in our sample with regular approval by one agency,
additional evidence on efficacy and safety became available only through
postmarketing obligations imposed by the other agency as a condition
to granting approval (there were only four cases in which such evidence
was requested by the agency granting regular approval). The case of
ponatinib is helpful to illustrate the role of mandating the collection
of postmarketing evidence. While the EMA granted regular approval
on the basis of a single-arm trial, the FDA granted approval through
the AA pathway, in part due to a potential safety issue detected in that
same single-arm trial. The FDA therefore requested additional safety
data from a postmarketing RCT, which had to be stopped early because
of a higher rate of adverse events in the ponatinib treatment arm.36 As
a consequence, the drug was temporarily withdrawn from the market
in the United States and subsequently reintroduced with a revised,
restricted indication.37 Prompted by the FDA action, the EMA also
reviewed the additional evidence and concluded that the benefit-risk
balance remained positive.38 Nevertheless, the EMA review of whether
additional evidence changed the benefit-risk assessment was only possi-
ble because additional evidence had been collected under the FDA AA
provisions.
This pattern of relevant evidence not materializing without regula-
tory obligation is not restricted to our sample of drugs: in a study of all
FDA-approved drugs between 2009 and 2012 that did not have FDA-
imposed postmarketing obligations, the majority of trials conducted af-
ter approval were found to be conducted in new indications (61%) or
expanded populations of the approved indication (20%).39 Taken to-
gether, the findings of that study and ours suggest that, unless regu-
lators impose the conduct of additional studies (typically through CMA
at the EMA or AA at the FDA), the evidence on efficacy and safety
in the intended population that is available at the time of market ap-
proval is all we will get. It is therefore important for policymakers to
consider the potential consequences of a shift in evidence standards for
initial approval. The routine granting of full approval for drugs with
limited data on benefits and risks can create a precedent for a lower evi-
dence threshold for drug approval being applied indiscriminately, with
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relevant additional evidence unlikely to materialize once the drug is on
the market.
Our finding that the EMA and the FDA do not use CMA and AA
approval congruently confirms and extends what other researchers have
reported.9,21,31 We investigated possible reasons for these discrepancies.
One potential reason relates to the fact that the EMA can grant CMA
only for first (or initial) marketing authorizations, but not for any sub-
sequent changes, such as extensions or variations of existing marketing
authorizations. In these situations, the EMA faces a decision to grant
approval (if the benefit-risk balance is deemed positive) or not (if it is
negative). The evidence in our sample points toward a more lenient ap-
proach by the EMA in these cases: approval was granted in four cases,
whereas no approval was given in only one of the cases in which the
statutory limitation on CMA applied.
Another possible explanation for the observed discrepancy in grant-
ing approval through CMA/AA vs. regular pathways is that the EMA
and the FDA based their assessments on different evidence. A study of
concordance between the EMA and the FDA across all therapeutic ar-
eas from 2014 to 2016 found overall very good agreement between the
two agencies for approval vs. no approval decisions; but, similar to our
study findings, there was considerable disagreement in the use of spe-
cial approval pathways.31 The study found that discordance in the use of
regulatory approval pathways was in equal parts due to differences in the
conclusions on efficacy drawn from the same clinical data submitted to
both regulators and to additional clinical data reviewed by one agency
but not the other. The situation was somewhat different in our study.
In our sample of 21 cancer drug-indication pairs with limited evidence
on efficacy and safety at the time of market entry, there were only two
cases in which different pivotal trials were submitted to the EMA and
the FDA—all others relied on the same clinical trial evidence but re-
sulted in approval through different pathways and discrepant regulatory
outcomes.
In a qualitative study with representatives from the EMA
and the FDA, respondents attributed divergent opinions on cancer drugs
to the fact that the EMA regarded PFS as clinical benefit in itself,
whereas the FDA saw it as a surrogate endpoint that would need to be
confirmed by additional studies.32 Such discrepant views could explain
a situation where the same evidence package leads to the FDA utilizing
the AA pathway and the EMA granting regular approval. However, we
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found only one case (lapatinib) in which different views on PFS could
have explained approval through regular EMA and FDA AA pathways.
Coincidentally, this was a variation of an existing marketing authoriza-
tion, and the discrepancy in regulatory pathways may also have been due
to statutory limitations for EMA’s use of CMA.
Evidence Standards for Regular Approval
An important finding of our study is that, despite discrepancies in the
use of EMA CMA and FDA AA, there was an overall high acceptance
of uncertainty for the approval of cancer drugs by both the EMA and
the FDA. Our sample consisted exclusively of drug-indication pairs for
which at least one of the two regulatory agencies considered the evi-
dence base (composed of the same pivotal trials in 19 cases) insufficient
to grant regular, or full, approval. Nevertheless, for more than half of the
21 matched drug-indication pairs, one of the agencies did grant regular
approval, indicating that regulators often did not consider it necessary to
impose obligations to collect additional evidence under the framework
of CMA or AA. In addition, regulators were far more likely to grant
approval than to deny it: there were only five drug-indication pairs for
which one of the agencies did not grant approval (four of the negative
decisions coming from the EMA and only one from the FDA). In many
cases, the exception of approving a drug with limited clinical evidence
on safety and efficacy has therefore become the norm. Our findings com-
plement and extend research by others about exceptionalism in drug
approval.40,41 Policymakers need to be aware of de facto (as opposed
to statutory) evidence standards applied by regulatory agencies to en-
ter an informed discussion about whether this is a desired trajectory for
regulating the medicinal products market. Granting regular approval
on the basis of early efficacy and safety data can affect the regulatory
landscape overall by signaling to pharmaceutical companies that evi-
dence that was historically considered for approval through special reg-
ulatory pathways (EMA CMA or FDA AA) may be sufficient for regular
approval.
Our findings further suggest that postmarketing obligations imposed
by regulators were unlikely to resolve unanswered questions concerning
efficacy and safety for a number of reasons.
26 M. Salcher-Konrad, H. Naci, and C. Davis
Issues With Timely Evidence Generation in the
Postmarketing Setting
First, there were often delays, sometimes substantial, in the conduct of
studies and submission of results from postmarketing obligations. Sixty-
one percent of EMA postmarketing obligations and 40% of FDA obliga-
tions in the CMA and AA pathways, respectively, were submitted with
a delay or were ongoing behind schedule. This is broadly in line with
previous studies of EMA postmarketing obligations.42,43 For the FDA,
our finding of a rate of 7% delayed ongoing studies is only half of that
found in a 25-year investigation of AA,25 but this may be explained
by the difference in time frames as well as play of chance, given that
we identified only three ongoing studies for drugs approved under the
FDA AA pathway. Overall, our study adds to previously voiced concerns
about the timeliness of postmarketing studies conducted as part of spe-
cial approval pathways.14,16
Policymakers should aim to create a regulatory environment in which
pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to produce this evidence.
Currently, there appears to be little to lose for companies once their
product has been approved. While some legal instruments exist in both
the EU and the United States to enforce compliance with postmar-
keting obligations (see Box), these are rarely used. The threat of re-
voking approval remains a tame one in the United States, where FDA
officials appear unwilling to withdraw market approval due to lack
of proven efficacy in a lengthy and resource-intensive process that in-
vokes an image of a regulator blocking patients from accessing an effec-
tive treatment.2 Stricter enforcement of compliance with postmarketing
obligations could improve the rate of timely fulfilled obligations and
lead to complete evidence packages becoming available for drugs with
EMA CMA or FDA AA. Regulators need to have the mandate to ensure
compliance with postmarketing obligations as part of their mission to
protect public health and ensure the availability of high-quality, safe,
and effective medicines for citizens.44,45 In addition, companies could
be incentivized to ensure timely completion of postmarketing studies
by making up-to-date status reports on postmarketing obligations and
their results publicly and easily available. Although such a database has
been introduced in the United States, it does not appear to be up-to-date
and complete. An equivalent database for the EU is missing.
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Issues With Robust Study Designs in the
Postmarketing Setting
The second reason postmarketing obligations were unlikely to provide
adequate answers to open questions about efficacy and safety is that regu-
lators appear to face a trade-off between receiving confirmatory evidence
either from robustly designed studies (i.e., RCTs) or studies conducted in
populations matching the approved indication, but not both. We found
that the EMA routinely accepted noncomparative studies to generate
confirmatory data, even in cases where CMA was granted on the basis
of single-arm trials (bosutinib, brentuximab vedotin, and vismodegib),
while FDA postmarketing obligations more typically consisted of RCTs.
The lack of a control in noncomparative studies hinders causal interpre-
tation of observed treatment effects. The suitability of such study designs
to establish or confirm a positive benefit-risk ratio of conditionally ap-
proved drugs is therefore questionable, as is reflected in conventional
grading of evidence frameworks and the default study design prefer-
ences of regulatory agencies.20,46-49 At the same time, the vast major-
ity (87%) of EMA postmarketing studies were planned to be conducted
in the same patient population for which approval was granted, while
the FDA accepted confirmatory studies conducted in a different setting
for a substantial minority (41%) of cases. This highlights an important
difference in the two agencies’ approach to postmarketing evidence gen-
eration: while the EMA has a demonstrated preference for confirmatory
evidence to come from the same population as the approved indication,
the FDA allows confirmatory studies to be conducted in a different pop-
ulation (typically in patients with less advanced disease) in an effort to
ensure postmarketing obligations are fulfilled.20 The FDA’s policy re-
flects considerations that RCTs may be difficult or unethical to conduct
in rare diseases or populations with no available therapy (although these
arguments can be challenged by examples of RCTs being conducted in
rare diseases and under challenging conditions50,51). Importantly, ap-
proval itself can be turned into an argument against conducting an RCT
to confirm the clinical benefit of a new drug. Regulatory approval signals
a positive benefit-risk balance to patients and physicians, even if based
on preliminary data, and creates ethical challenges for withholding the
drug from patients when conducting a confirmatory trial in the approved
indication in a setting where the drug has become available. However,
failure to conduct a robust study in the intended patient populations
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results in the availability of a drug on the market without confirmed
positive benefit-risk ratio; in other words, a different evidence standard
is being applied where preliminary trial results are deemed sufficient.
In these circumstances, it is important to consider the uncertainty sur-
rounding the evidence base for initial (special) approval. Special, rather
than regular, approval pathways are used when there is a need for confir-
mation of an indicative positive benefit-risk ratio. The strongest confir-
matory evidence will come from robust studies demonstrating a causal
positive treatment effect in the population that the drug is intended for.
To address issues with postmarketing study designs, it is instructive to
revisit the original AAmodel, introduced in theUnited States in 1992 to
address the evidence vs. access conundrum when promising treatments
emerged to treat HIV/AIDS patients. The FDA has described the “ideal
approach” to AA as following up pivotal, randomized trials in the post-
marketing phase to obtain confirmatory evidence using patient-relevant
outcomes after initial approval based on a surrogate measure.20 How-
ever, this standard was abandoned by the FDA due to concerns about
the feasibility of continuing an RCT while the experimental drug was
already available.
Although we found that the EMA and the FDA routinely deviated
from the gold standard for confirmatory studies by either accepting weak
study designs (EMA) or different populations (FDA), our sample also
included a case that illustrates that the original model of obtaining con-
firmatory evidence from an RCT in the intended population was still
possible, if only requested by the regulatory agency. Ofatumumab was
approved through both the EMA CMA and the FDA AA pathways for
treatment of refractory chronic lymphocytic leukemia on the basis of a
single-arm trial. Both agencies imposed a confirmatory RCT as a post-
marketing obligation. However, while the FDA accepted a confirmatory
RCT in an earlier treatment setting, the confirmatory RCT requested by
the EMA was in the same population as the approved indication. This
study was completed in a timely manner. Upon its completion, the EMA
converted from CMA to regular approval. (Coincidentally, the RCT had
failed to meet its primary endpoint of improved PFS by independent re-
view committee and also failed to demonstrate improved overall survival
with ofatumumab compared to physician’s choice of therapy, although
it showed improved PFS by investigators’ assessment and time to next
therapy.33)
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Issues With Study Endpoints in the
Postmarketing Setting
Another reason postmarketing studies in our sample may not adequately
address uncertainty around the benefit-risk ratio is the use of surrogate
measures, such as response rate or PFS, instead of patient-relevant out-
comes, such as overall survival or quality of life. Although surrogate
measures are potentially a useful tool to shorten clinical trial duration
if they reliably predict clinical benefit, the validity of even widely used
surrogates such as PFS in cancer often remains unproven.52,53 When sur-
rogate measures are used for regulatory approval of cancer drugs, they are
typically nonvalidated in both Europe and the United States.54,55 In our
sample, the most commonly used primary endpoint in clinical postmar-
keting studies of drugs approved through the EMA CMA or FDA AA
pathway was PFS, followed by response rate. Our results show that, for
drugs with less complete efficacy data than usually required at the time
of approval, it is unlikely that robust overall survival data become avail-
able in the postmarketing setting. Postmarketing obligations included
overall survival as primary endpoint for only 25% and 24% of EMA and
FDA approvals, respectively. Moreover, all EMA obligations after CMA
with overall survival primary endpoints were single-arm studies, which
are not suitable for measuring time-to-event endpoints due to the lack
of a comparator. Our study adds to other research showing that clini-
cal studies in the postmarketing setting are likely to measure surrogate
outcomes,14 including the same measures that were used for initial ap-
proval in special regulatory pathways.7,25
There is now a body of literature, including this study, demonstrat-
ing that postmarketing studies are often delayed in both the EU and
the United States,14,16,42 do not commonly use robust study designs or
patient-relevant endpoints,14,24,25,56 and are subject to substantial devi-
ations from initially imposed requirements.43,57 We therefore echo con-
cerns previously voiced by others about placing too much emphasis on
postmarketing studies to address uncertainties in the evidence submit-
ted at the time of market approval.42,58 Given the importance of post-
marketing evidence generation as an integral component of EMA CMA
and FDA AA, shortcomings in the design and conduct of studies in this
setting raise the question whether these special approval pathways work
as intended.
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Limitations
Our study covers cancer drugs with EMA outcomes from 2009 to 2013
inclusive. We chose the time frame in order to allow for sufficient time
to complete postmarketing obligations and take the current status of
EMA CMAs and FDA AAs into consideration. The time period of our
study allowed for a minimum of five years to complete and submit post-
marketing studies, in line with previous research.56
Our study was limited to cancer drugs. This is by far the largest group
of therapeutic agents receiving EMACMA and FDAAA.7,13 Despite the
focus on one therapeutic area, our findings are therefore highly relevant
for other products that benefit from these special approval pathways. A
recent example is hydroxyprogesterone caproate, a drug for preventing
preterm births, which had received FDA AA but failed to demonstrate
effectiveness in a confirmatory trial, leading consumer rights advocates
to call for its withdrawal from the market.59
The focus on cancer drugs with regulatory outcomes from 2009 to
2013 led to a sample of 21 drug-indication pairs. We considered the
limitations of a small sample size to be more than offset by the opportu-
nity to investigate the evidence requirements and regulatory decisions
for each in more detail. Focusing on a five-year period allowed us to in-
vestigate regulatory decision making under uncertainty, including both
preapproval and postapproval evidence requirements. Furthermore, we
included all cancer drug-indication pairs in the chosen time period for
which either EMA CMA or FDA AA was granted. Our sample there-
fore represents a full overview of regulatory decisions for cancer drugs
for which at least one regulator considered the evidence on efficacy and
safety insufficient for regular approval. Due to negative FDA decisions
not being published systematically, we did not include cases where the
FDA denied approval and an application for EMA approval was never
submitted. However, this is in line with the aims of this study, since
we were only interested in drug-indication pairs for which a regulatory
outcome by both the EMA and the FDA existed.
Our sample included variations of existing approvals, for which the
EMA cannot grant approval through the CMA pathway. Although this
represents an important difference in how the two regulatory bodies can
manage uncertainty, our study fully took this statutory restriction into
account by explicitly considering a range of regulatory tools, including
outcomes (approval vs. no approval decision), pathways (regular approval
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vs. approval through a special pathway), final approved indications, and
postmarketing obligations, instead of focusing on the regulatory path-
way alone.
There were also limitations in the information we were able to ex-
tract. We relied on publicly available documents, but found that these
sometimes lacked important details. For example, for most approvals
for variations of existing drugs, the FDA does not provide review doc-
uments. We also had difficulties ascertaining the status of some post-
marketing obligations. With no comprehensive, up-to-date database of
postmarketing obligations available, information on the status of these
studies had to be traced through a variety of sources, as described in the
methods section. We could determine only whether obligations were
considered fulfilled by the regulatory agency—this included instances
where the manufacturer was released of an obligation, and the study was
never completed, and at least one case where a trial demonstrated inferi-
ority of the conditionally approved drug,33 yet the obligation to conduct
the study was considered fulfilled.
Conclusions
US and European drug regulators were often willing to grant regular
approval to cancer drugs for which data on efficacy and safety were less
complete than usually required, rather than deny approval or require
the collection of additional evidence through AA and CMA pathways,
respectively. When postmarketing studies were imposed, shortcomings
in their design and delayed submission of results raise questions over the
ability of the FDA’s AA and the EMA’s CMA to reconcile early market
access with maintaining rigorous regulatory standards.
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